India took in Russian raw oil valued at around Euro 144 billion as the conflict in Ukraine started thereby securing the number two place among the oil buyers of China. The estimation from the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air reveals how the international market was reconfigured substantially by the cheap Russian oil and how it even resulted in changing India’s energy security policy.
The shift in India towards discounted Russian crude oil
The Russian fossil fuel overall purchase by India got to Euro 162.5 billion with the Euro 143.88 billion of oil and Euro 18.18 billion of coal. On the other side, India as the world’s third major oil importer, made a very fast switch from the Middle East grades right after sanctions and lower demand for European oil sources had the effect of flooding the global market with Russian barrels available at very preferential rates.
Russia had less than 1% of its crude in the Indian basket before the conflict. In the highest instances, that percentage reached almost 40% due to refiners being after the lucrative economics and supplies that were stable. The shift, in return, helped in the restraining of inflation and enhancement of refining margins, though the risks like shipping, insurance, and payments also rose in this situation.
China and the EU are still the main sources of income for Russia
China was the highest spender with a total of Euro 293.7 billion on fossil fuels from February 2022, with Euro 210.3 billion attributed to oil, but also including coal and gas. In the meantime, the European Union was recorded to have spent Euro 218.1 billion split between oil and gas, Euro 106.3 billion and Euro 108.2 billion respectively.
A Euro 1 trillion fossil‑fuel war chest
CREA has estimated that Russia’s global fossil fuel sales have brought in around Euro 1 trillion since the beginning of the invasion. About one‑fifth of the total amount comes from the European Union and gas sales are the biggest part of it. These revenues still go to the war, in spite of the embargoes and price ceilings set to reduce Moscow’s money inflows.
Sanctions, alignment, and non‑alignment
Though the G7 and the EU economies have enforced restrictions and export controls, there is no UN Security Council resolution supporting these actions. Some countries, like China, India, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, are not in favor of unilateral sanctions. Turkey and Serbia are among the nations that have opted not to follow suit.
Loopholes, pipelines, and a shadow fleet
Russian oil is still able to make its way into the European Union in spite of the embargoes, the most notable recipients being Hungary and Slovakia. This is an activity that has been pungent due to the derogations of pipelines. Also, Russian crude-derived products, in the form of the refined ones, have been marketed and sold in the sanctioning markets. In order to transport crude, Russia extended its shadow fleet, which also helped in the leak of gas to the European allies which were not sanctioning the countries.
The European Union’s importation of fossil fuels from Russia had reduced because of the crude oil and refined oil bans at the end of 2022 and 2023, respectively. But as of the third quarter of 2025, the situation was limited to Hungary and Slovakia as the only buyers of Russian oil transported by pipelines. On the other hand, Russian gas still remains as a non-sanctioned and one of the key revenue sources.
India’s Russian share falls under new pressure
Fresh sanctions were imposed by the U. S. on Rosneft and Lukoil companies and they came into force on November 22, 2025. After that, Russia’s share in India’s crude oil imports went down to less than 25% and it is theaping further low down due to the buyers changing their position on the matter. The amount of non‑sanctioned entities’ crude oil was demanded by India almost with the value of Euro 72.92 million in early January, down from Euro 130.49 million in late November.
Compared to last July, the highest value in the future will be seen at 189.07million Euros per day, which implies that company has lost so much business volumewise. More stringent measurements, as well as higher costs due to freight and insurance, and the evolving demand for thorough background checks are all leading to safer and currently less cost-effective procurement from Russia.
Refiners recalibrate strategies
Reliance Industries, once the largest customer of Russian crude in India, has stopped the oil imports from Russia, its largest supplier, and doesn’t anticipate getting January cargo. Additionally, Russian crude has been cut out of the export-friendly fuel production chain. HPCL, HMEL, MRPL have all stopped procurement, as in the new scenario the sanctions and logistics have been tightened.
On the other hand, the procurement processes of Indian Oil Corporation and BPCL are intact with no sanctioned Russian entities in the picture. Nayara Energy, the Rosneft-backed entity that is under EU sanctions, goes on with its purchases from Rosneft and other Russian traders. Despite the EU’s ban on fuel made from Russian oil, Australia, Canada, and the US are yet to come up with similar prohibitions of such products.
The shifting tides of India’s oil imports:
The Iraq Era (2018–21): The undisputed leader (~23% share)
The Russian Surge (2023–25): Historic pivot to #1 (~40% peak).
India’s geopolitical energy map continues to redraw itself. 🌏🛢️ pic.twitter.com/Rk3Lk39ols
— Indian Strategic Studies Forum (@ISSF_India) January 6, 2026
Economics vs. geopolitics
Discounted oil from Russia had been a big help to India’s import and refining industry and was likely to continue. However, there were still the inevitable sanctions and their implementation to contend with. This was leading slowly but surely to a reshift of the weighted barrel slate back from different origins and toward the Middle East, on the one hand, and a much more diverse and compliant source portfolio, on the other hand.
The next factors traders should anticipate
– Harsher monitoring of the limitations of prices, the firing, and the insurance, and stringent checks for vessel ownership and the origin of the load.
– Restoring or expanding Russia’s covert tanker fleet and/or breaking the oil flows from the affected routes.
– The enlargement and dependency of European gas and the issue of gas pipeline exemptions in Hungary and Slovakia.
– India’s share of Russian oil on a month-on-month basis and whether the country’s import levels might hit multi-year lows.
Wider policy implications for the world of energy
India’s approach is still being firmly based on affordability, supply security, and legal compliance. On one hand, policymakers and refiners are on the path fraught with difficulties, where they need to keep the energy flow to consumers stable, strive to reach the same environmental and fiscal objectives set in Paris, and to avoid US secondary sanctions at the same time. This delicate balance, in turn, will be key to the selection of procurement pathways by 2026.
Summing up with the power of data
– India: Euro 143.88 billion oil, Euro 18.18 billion coal purchases from Russia since February 2022.
– China: Euro 293.7 billion invested, including Euro 210.3 billion oil.
– EU: Euro 218.1 billion invested, including Euro 106.3 billion oil and Euro 108.2 billion gas.
– Russia: An estimated global revenue of around Euro 1 trillion from the fossil‑fuel sector since the war began.
India has a bill of 144 billion Euros to pay for oil which means that the country is responding in a very realistic way to a volatile market. If sanctions get tougher and discounts get smaller, the strategy is changing. The following period may involve the decrease of Russian exports, the spread of supply from several sources, and very strict control of each barrel that becomes part of the Indian energy mix.
